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Abstract 
The success of PPP-BOT projects largely depends on effectively mitigating the impact of a 
variety of risks and uncertainties, especially those influencing the revenue over time. Revenue 
instability is one of the main obstacles of PPP form of procurement. Government support, which 
is established as a clause in the concession agreement, should be carefully designed and well 
formulated. Options which arise from certain clauses in the contract are more valuable for risky 
projects. The purpose of this paper’s proposed model is to evaluate early fund generation options 
and also to calculate equitable bounds for a guaranteed revenue for the project sponsor under 
uncertainty and risk. The model is specially designed to alleviate the concern of revenue risk. To 
illustrate its applicability the methodology is then applied to a freeway PPP project and a power 
plant PPP project in Iran. The results show that the value of these options can indeed be significant 
and by applying the proposed systematic negotiation mechanism both public and private sectors can 
take advantage of its flexibility at the negotiation table. The proposed mechanisms can facilitate 
negotiations on the verge of a break down as well as accelerating ongoing negotiations that have 
become moribund. 
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Options-Based Negotiation Management of PPP-BOT Infrastructure Projects 
Abstract 
The success of PPP-BOT projects largely depends on effectively mitigating the impact of a 
variety of risks and uncertainties, especially those influencing the revenue over time. Revenue 
instability is one of the main obstacles of PPP form of procurement. Government support, which 
is established as a clause in the concession agreement, should be carefully designed and well 
formulated. Options which arise from certain clauses in the contract are more valuable for risky 
projects. The purpose of this paper’s proposed model is to evaluate early fund generation options 
and also to calculate equitable bounds for a guaranteed revenue for the project sponsor under 
uncertainty and risk. The model is specially designed to alleviate the concern of revenue risk. To 
illustrate its applicability the methodology is then applied to a freeway PPP project and a power 
plant PPP project in Iran. The results show that the value of these options can indeed be 
significant and by applying the proposed systematic negotiation mechanism both public and private 
sectors can take advantage of its flexibility at the negotiation table. The proposed mechanisms can 
facilitate negotiations on the verge of a break down as well as accelerating ongoing negotiations that 
have become moribund. 
Introduction on Government Support 
For Public Private Partnership (PPP)-Build Operate Transfer (BOT) projects, the majority of 
funding will come from banks and financial institutions in the form of loan capital. In this case, the 
project revenue will be used to reimburse loans, finance maintenance and operational costs. Thus 
the project promoters are concerned not only with the expected future income but also with the 
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risk factors influencing the revenue over time. The higher the risk and uncertainty of the revenue 
and profit, the higher the return required (Ye and Tiong, 2000). The success of PPP-BOT 
projects largely depends upon effectively mitigating the impacts of a variety of risks and 
uncertainties. Moreover, since the debt repayments depend on the ability of the project to 
generate cash flows, lenders are also concerned with the financial performance of the project. 
They are unwilling to lend unless the majority of the risks involved in the project life-cycle are 
adequately addressed (specifically the revenue risk). Their goal is to find a balance between the 
degree of secured debt and the interest rate. 
Revenue instability and cash flow volatility, which derive from revenue uncertainty, are the 
most frequently cited obstacles of PPP-BOT arrangements (Ye and Tiong, 2000; Attarzadeh, 
2007). Shortfall in government support, good cash flows with reasonable returns, and predictable 
risk scenarios have been identified as main reasons of recent PPP-BOT project failures 
(Kumaraswamy and Morris, 2002; Carbonara et al., 2014a). Project pro forma cash flow is more 
sensitive to revenue instability and high revenue instability would generate unpredictability. 
Quantity of production is important cause of revenue instability and cash flow volatility 
(Attarzadeh, 2014). This effectively highlights the importance of mechanisms aimed at providing 
flexibility in addressing financial risks associated with revenue instability and managing revenue 
risk. With a reduced financial cost, the concessionaire has a greater willingness to invest which 
may result in a lower tariff for the end user. It also increases the bidders’ competitiveness in the 
tender process. 
In practice (Zhang, 2005; Tiong et al., 1992), PPP-BOT projects are more likely to fail in the 
development phase than in the other phases. Due to the high risk and uncertainty in some of 
these projects, there is little common ground for negotiations to arrive at an amiable position. In 
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such circumstance the government is pushed to take up more risks of the project so that the 
private sector can afford a better expected return. Thus, government support plays an important 
role in risk-return trade-off and project success. Since each party of a PPP-BOT project has its 
own objectives and concerns, each has a different risk-return trade-off analysis. However, the 
design of government support is still an open issue and a hot topic for research. It is difficult to 
assess and provide the appropriate level of government support especially under uncertainties 
and risks. 
In addition to cash subsidies, there are a number of government support initiatives that could 
be offered to concessionaire, each with its own characteristics. These may be classified broadly 
into two categories: guarantee support and financial and incentives support. There are several 
types of support that fall under the rubric ‘guarantee support’. These include, inter alia, equity, 
debt, exchange rate, minimum demand, minimum revenue (MRG), tariff/toll and maximum 
interest rate guarantees. Similarly, ‘financial and incentive supports’ include direct capital 
contributions (e.g. grants, subordinated loans (extra loan), debt and equity investment), shadow 
toll/tariff, concession period extension, revenue enhancements, reduction of front-end cost, free 
use of project site and associated facilities, preferential tax incentives (e.g. tax breaks, tax 
exemption for a certain number of years), comfort letter, interest-free financing, option to defer, 
to abandon, to alter, to switch and the growth option (Vassallo, 2006; Brandão and Saraiva, 
2008; Carbonara et al., 2014b; Attarzadeh, 2014). 
The major objective of financial and incentives support from government is to directly 
improve the financial conditions of private investors through reduction in the private investment 
amount. The major side effect of the guarantee support and financial and incentives support is to 
reduce the perception of risk for financial institutions, which, in turn, reduces the financial cost 
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of the project (Fishbein and Babbar, 1996; Attarzadeh, 2014). Effectively, these mechanisms 
should reduce the cash flow volatility, add flexibility to the project and allow for better 
management of the concession items which are subject to risks and uncertainties. The 
effectiveness of these mechanisms is one of the main concerns of existing studies (Ford et al., 
2002; Galera and Solino, 2010; Sun and Zhang, 2015). Additionally, a PPP-BOT contract could 
be designed, by government supports and incentives, to induce the promoter firm to invest in the 
best quality and achieve best efficiency. Host governments must be able to identify when to offer 
incentives for PPP-BOT projects. The support should be consistent with the projects’ viability to 
increase the private sector’s participation and motivation. One or more forms of government 
support is applicable under limited circumstances and could contribute to fend off project 
bankruptcy (Ho and Liu, 2002; Ye and Tiong, 2000). As can be seen, the guarantees and 
financial and incentives supports provided by government are represented as risk mitigation 
strategies and mechanisms to infrastructure concessions. Such government guarantees can reduce 
project risks and uncertainties and therefore increases the project’s value. However, they create 
an uncertain future commitment for the government, which is not free of cost. A study shows 
that guarantee costs can average as much as a third of the amount guaranteed (Lewis and Mody, 
1998). The cost of the guarantees must be estimated and compared with the equivalent subsidies 
in order to ascertain which of the approaches are more effective in reducing the project risk and 
uncertainty. 
In some circumstances, even when a project is expected to be entirely profitable, the project 
sponsors may encounter a lack of available fund in the ramp-up phase in order to service loans and 
cover the O&M costs. In such cases, the project sponsors are looking for the most cost-effective 
option available for revenue generation to meet the cash obligations and effectively reduce long-
Page | 5 
 
term costs. Nevertheless, planning for this option must be done carefully to avoid revenue instability 
issues at the early stage of the project’s operation and effectively cover revenue shortfalls. The 
concession agreement, therefore, needs to be regulated for the early stages of operation phase in 
order to yield the necessary revenue for full cost recovery of operation and maintenance 
expenditures and debt services. However, very few researchers have proposed a reasonable way to 
control the revenue instability and cash flow volatility, specifically in the ramp-up phase of PPP-
BOT projects. 
The MRG put options have been studied as a way to manage the revenue risk and also 
guarantees a minimum level of revenue. The key limitations of this method are its requirement for 
the concessionaire to assume a risk premium which it is probable unwilling to do and MRG put 
options as a contract’s contingent clauses does not create symmetric payoffs for parties involved in 
the project. This support and incentive scheme enhances the cash flow to Project Company by 
limiting the downside. However, in order to avoid giving away too much to the concessionaire, 
the host government would also attempt to counterbalance the grant by introducing additional 
repayment obligations, such as demanding a reduction and placement of a cap on the tariff/toll 
rates to benefit the end user. Alternatively, the government could seek additional revenue by 
imposing higher taxes on the concessionaire or even call for direct participation as a sharing 
mechanism in the upside of the project returns. Therefore, during the negotiation stage with 
investors, the host government should seek agreement on the equitable amount of MRG once 
such scenario takes place. This is similar to the hedging feature of real options (RO). Thus these 
supports and repayments could be formulated as options that the government provides for Project 
Company by real options valuation and analysis (ROV/ROA) (Hemming, 2006; Chiara et al., 
2007).  
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Significance of Research and Contribution to the Body of Knowledge 
The methodology developed in this paper contributes to the literature in two main aspects: 
First, this study proposes the early fund generation (EFG) option and presents a means for valuing 
of EFG option as an incentive to offset construction acceleration by concessionaire. Under the 
conditions of revenue instability during the early stage of project operation, the situation can be 
improved through a mechanism that permits the project company to generate fund from the project 
operation as early as possible instead of short-term borrowings. This will allow the project company 
to continue to operate as it is receiving a steady income. The purpose of EFG option is to raise the 
necessary funds for the project by delivering project’s services/products at the earlier possible time 
which lead to reduce the revenue risk in the ramp-up phase. Specifically, this option could be 
applied in the first years of operation where operating revenues are not sufficient to meet the debt 
service obligations and O&M costs. 
Second, this study proposes guaranteed upper and lower bound of revenue (MinMax-GR) 
option as a revenue risk management model for PPP-BOT projects based on the options strategy. 
This is as a means to hedge against the risk of revenue uncertainty in PPP-BOT projects and 
enhance project’s financial viability. It provides a framework for the concessionaire to share a 
certain percentage of losses in a form of win-win solution, i.e. the government captures a portion of 
the income when the concessionaire’s revenue exceeds certain levels. In particular, a procedure is 
proposed to calculate equitable bound for a guaranteed revenue (GR) for project sponsor under 
uncertainties and risks. It includes a method to determine a fair value as maximum GR against the 
predetermined minimum GR, which contributes to estimate max guaranteed equity rate of return, 
i.e. the value of the call option equals the value of the put option. By adopting this option, it is 
possible to limit the revenue risk to a certain range through introducing an upper and lower bound 
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for revenue. MinMax-GR option is a combination of a call option and a put option, a cap and a 
floor for revenue. It isolates the concessionaire from both sides of the revenue spectrum, obligates 
the underwriter to cover the entire loss while allowing it to capture all of the excess profits, so that 
the option underwriter can ensure a chance of earning profits. A MinMax-GR option is best suited 
to projects with cash flows that are subject to revenue volatility throughout its life cycle, especially 
in the ramp-up phase. Ultimately, the government grant minimum revenue guarantee (MRG) in 
exchange for sharing upside revenue. So, when the MinMax-GR option model is applied, the loss 
that could occur because of the costs caused by revenue risks can be controlled within a set of range, 
associated with upper and lower guaranteed equity rate of return and revenue. 
The remainder of this paper has the following structure. After an overall review of the 
government support, relevant research on real options application is analysed and discussed. 
Following this, the valuation process of two proposed options as well as real option models are 
presented in detail. On this basis, an illustrative example and a case study are conducted to 
demonstrate the application of the proposed options and the relevant evaluation methods in PPP 
a freeway and a power plant project. This is followed by a discussion on the theoretical and 
practical implications of the findings/results, main managerial implications of the study and its 
advantages to engineering/management decision makings. The final section summarizes the 
study, draws conclusions and suggests further areas of research. 
Background to Real Options in Infrastructure Development 
The use of real options in infrastructure development while still in its infancy, has gained 
popularity. Rather than focusing on the detailed theory of real options and its application in the 
context of infrastructure projects that have been elaborated in much of the literature, this paper 
demonstrates the studies dealing with guarantee support and financial and incentive supports. 
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Research, albeit not a lot has been conducted into various aspects related to government 
guarantees in infrastructure development and PPP projects (Garvin & Ford, 2012; Pellegrino et 
al., 2013). A real option pricing model to evaluate the impact of the government debt guarantee 
and the developer negotiation option on the financial viability of the privatized infrastructure 
projects was developed by Ho and Liu (2002). Valuing the government guarantees and their 
financial impact on BOT toll road from both the government and sponsor’s perspective has been 
studied by Wibowo (2004), who finds that the guarantees are not cost free, if compared with 
equivalent subsidies, however, some guarantees are proven to be more effective in the 
negotiations, in term of reducing risk of the project sponsor having negative NPVs. Garvin and 
Cheah (2004) focused on the methods of valuing private investments in public infrastructure and 
evaluated the deferment option, concluding that the selection of a valuation model depends 
critically upon the characteristics of a project's variables and that informed judgment remains an 
integral part of the decision-making process. A real option model to evaluate several options 
including government guarantees in a power plant project in India was developed by Cheah and 
Liu (2005), who found that RO approach demonstrates a great promise in capturing and 
evaluating flexibilities. Their work was extended to include Monte Carlo simulation (Cheah and 
Liu, 2006) to evaluate government guarantees and subsidies as real options. Liu and Cheah 
(2009) illustrated the analysis of two types of options: the incentive scheme, guarantee, and 
repayment feature, the placement of a cap on the tariff/toll rates. They demonstrated that a 
negotiation band incorporating these option values could be constructed which would enlarge the 
feasible bargaining range for both parties to prevent a total negotiation breakdown. Qiu and 
Wang (2011) developed a model to examine the incentives, efficiency and regulation in BOT 
contracts. With real option theory, Liu et al. (2014) analysed government’s guarantee of 
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restrictive competition in PPP projects, and constructs an evaluation model for restrictive 
competition. The results illustrate the significance of the valuation to both host government and 
investors, and provide them with a clear reference when negotiating on the level of restrictive 
competition. Shan et al. (2010) presented collar option, which is a combination of a put and call 
option, as a technique to manage revenue risks. Furthermore, its potential features were derived 
from an exploration of existing risk management practices in real toll projects. Based on the 
discounted cash flow (DCF) analysis and the real option valuation, Jeong et al. (2015) developed 
a model to evaluate the financial viability of a BOT project for highway service areas in South 
Korea. Based on the NPV method and real option pricing model, Li et al. (2016) proposed a 
method for assessing the investment value of a privately-owned public rental housing project. 
Some of the researchers focused specifically on the analysis of necessity of MRG to enhance 
the financial feasibility of PPP-BOT projects. Huang and Chou (2006) developed a compound 
option pricing model. The combination of MRG and the option to abandon in the pre-
construction phase were studied as a series of European style call options. Vassallo and Solino 
(2006) described the applied model and results of the MRG mechanism implementation in Chile. 
Chiara et al. (2007) presented least-squares Monte Carlo method for quantifying the value of a 
MRG as Bermudan (American) options in a BOT project. This approach is presented and 
illustrated to determine the fair value of the real option. Galera and Solino (2010) developed a 
real option-based methodology to value minimum traffic guarantee of highway concessions. 
Ashuri et al. (2012) applied the real options theory to price MRG and traffic revenue cap (TRC) 
options as compound options in BOT projects and determined their effects on the 
concessionaire’s economic risk profile. Carbonara et al. (2014 a,b) developed a real option-based 
model that uses a new mechanism for setting the revenue guarantee level secured by the 
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government, which balances the private sector’s profitability needs and the public sector’s fiscal 
management interests and uses the concept of fairness for structuring MRGs. The model uses 
Monte Carlo simulation to take into account uncertainty which is applied to a toll road project in 
Italy. It was found that government support is often needed to make the project attractive to 
private investors and that the developed model can be, for both public and private sectors, a valid 
tool for defining the fair value of the minimum amount of revenue secured by the government. 
Using a revised NPV financial evaluation model and the Monte Carlo simulation technique, Sun 
and Zhang (2015) established a model to determine the optimum solution of MRG level and the 
royalty collection rate from the operational revenue to automatically balance the risks and 
rewards between public and private sectors under the fixed concession period for BOT projects. 
PPP-BOT projects are characterized by high capital outlays, long lead times, and long 
operation periods, which make the forecast of cash flows more difficult and expose participants 
to high level of financial risk and uncertainty. The purpose of proposing Fuzzy numbers (fuzzy 
set theory) is to provide an alternative approach to conventional probability for treating 
uncertainties in the simulation input including the parameters of the PDFs/CDFs. Possibility 
analysis entails the uncertain variables in input of simulation (or financial) model (uncertainties) 
expressed as membership function using fuzzy logic (uncertain variable follows a specific 
membership function) (Dubois and Prade, 1988; Pedrycz and Gomide, 1998; Ferrero and 
Salicone 2002, 2006; Klir and Yuan, 1995; Klir et al., 1997; Attarzadeh, 2014; Attarzadeh et al., 
2017). 
From the above literature review, it can be deduced that although PPP and real options 
application has become a hot topic in construction management research, study on revenue 
instability and cash flow volatility, especially during the early stage of project operation and also 
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evaluation and analysis of equitable guaranteed bound of cash flow, remains surprisingly scarce. 
Research on guarantees tends to focus on MRG, demand guarantee, and price guarantee. These 
types of guarantees reflect investors’ concerns over the shortage of market demand. On the other 
hand, research on EFG option and equitable upper bound for guaranteed revenue for project 
sponsor, which would arguably take place under the scenario of an increased market demand, is 
scarce. Quantitative modelling and analysis of these options are even scarcer. This research 
intends to fill this gap by modelling and analysis of EFG and upper and lower bound for 
guaranteed revenue options as real options and developing a framework to assess the value of 
flexibility. Therefore a win-win prospect can be achieved in PPP concession contracts for both 
parties. However, little research to date has focused on these aspects. 
Real Options Valuation and Analysis 
An option may be defined as an opportunity to take a beneficial action, within a bounded 
time frame, when a favourable condition occurs. Accordingly, option theory studies on how to 
model and price this opportunity which is typically either a contractual right or system flexibility 
(Zhao and Tseng, 2003; Chiara et al., 2007; Chiara and Garvin, 2008). Options mechanism is a 
hedging opportunity which limits risks and uncertainties and encourages private sector 
participation. Although there is an option cost to the government, this is considerably less than if 
the government carries the whole project costs. Using the options mechanism it is possible that 
the private party could reach common ground in the negotiations a lot earlier because there are 
obvious financial advantages for them. Options add value to the project in such a way that a 
specific project with a negative net present value (NPV) could be acceptable if the value of the 
options for the concessionaire outweighs the negative value of the NPV. 
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Government support, as a clause in the concession agreement, is a government liability and 
an asset of the project company. So it is vital for both parties to estimate and quantify the value 
of the support (so-called options valuation). Generally, the value of such an option is 
considerable. Failing to consider the value of the option by the government may unknowingly 
provide the concessionaire with excessive support. Consequently, the concessionaire will be over 
subsidized. Alternatively, failing to consider the value of the option by the concessionaire may 
unwittingly ignore or assign a conservative value to the option in view of its ambiguity. 
Accordingly, the concessionaire will either underestimate or overestimate the investment value. 
The value of options is often hard to quantify. Usually it is estimated by the difference 
between the value of cash flow with support and the value of cash flow without support. The 
most important evaluation criterion for measure the financial viability of PPP-BOT projects is 
the equity value. The value of government support is reflected in equity value, with the aim of 
scenarios comparison and decision makings. By incorporating these options the negotiation 
bound can be constructed which would enlarge the feasible bargaining range for both parties.  It 
is possible that a feasible bargaining range may not even exist between the public and the private 
sectors if the value of options as the incentive schemes and the repayment features is omitted. 
This advantage facilitates decision making under uncertainties and risks. 
Real option theory is option theory applied to non-financial or real assets (Myers, 1984). Real 
option analysis overcomes some of the shortcomings of conventional NPV/Internal Rate of 
Return (IRR) DCF analysis and capital budgeting methods to price investments with flexibilities 
(Lander and Pinches, 1998). There are two types of options: the call and the put. An option gives 
the right, but not the obligation to either buy (call option) or sell (put option) the underlying asset 
at a certain price (strike price) on a specified future date (expiry date). For this right, the buyer of 
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the option pays a premium upfront (non-refundable) to the seller (or writer) of the option. The 
selling or buying of an asset at the strike price is termed “exercising the option”. As can be seen, 
the option buyer has unlimited gain and limited loss (premium). In contrast, the option seller has 
limited gain (premium) and unlimited loss (Damodaran, 2001).  
Call options are used in order to capitalize on an increasing trend in the market (risky 
project). The payoff for a call option (C) is estimated using the following equation: 
                                               𝐶 = 𝑀𝑎𝑥[(𝑆 − 𝐾), 0], {
𝐶 > 0 𝑖𝑓 𝑆 > 𝐾
𝐶 = 0 𝑖𝑓 𝑆 ≤ 𝐾
}                                                                         (1) 
 
 
Where S is the current price (market price) and K is the strike price (or exercise price). (See 
Figure 1) 
In contrast, the put options are used in order to capitalize on a decreasing trend in the market 
(risky project). The payoff for a put option (P) is estimated using the following equation:  
𝑃 = 𝑀𝑎𝑥[(𝐾 − 𝑆), 0], {
𝑃 > 0 𝑖𝑓 𝐾 > 𝑆
𝑃 = 0 𝑖𝑓 𝐾 ≤ 𝑆
}              (2) 
As can be seen, an option provides an opportunity for the decision maker to take some action 
after the risks and uncertaities are revealed. For instance, the owner of a call option will exercise 
the option only after learning that the current price S is greater than exercise price K. 
In the PPP-BOT context the underlying cash flow is the underlying asset. For instance the 
highway traffic volume (a non-financial variable) is considered as the underlying asset in 
Payoff
K
S
Payoff
K
S
Figure 1 European style Call (left) and Put (right) options 
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trasportation projects. The strike price is linked to the guaranteed cash flow. The current price is 
linked to the expected cash flow (Charo et al., 2003; Galera and Solino, 2010). For instance, the 
payoff of guaranteed minimum traffic volume (GMTV) as a put option and also the payoffs of 
two cases, with and without this guarantee, are shown in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2 payoffs of minimum traffic volume guarantee (GMTV) 
The cash flow (payoff) at year t is 𝐶𝐹𝑡, option value at year t is 𝑂𝑉𝑡, and total option value is 
𝑂𝑉, are calculated using the equations 3 and 4. Where 𝑉𝑡 is the traffic volume at year t, 𝑉𝐺 or 
𝐺𝑀𝑇𝑉 is the guaranteed minimum traffic volume, 𝑥 is toll rate, 𝐸𝑡 is O&M costs at year t, 𝑇 is 
tax rate and 𝑂𝑃 is operation period. 
𝐶𝐹𝑡 = {
(𝑉𝑡𝑥 − 𝐸𝑡)(1 − 𝑇)         𝑖𝑓 𝑉𝑡 ≥ 𝑉𝐺
(𝑉𝐺𝑥 − 𝐸𝑡)(1 − 𝑇)         𝑖𝑓 𝑉𝑡 < 𝑉𝐺
}                         (3) 
𝑂𝑉𝑡 = {
                     0                                  𝑖𝑓 𝑉𝑡 ≥ 𝑉𝐺
((𝑉𝐺 − 𝑉𝑡)𝑥 − 𝐸𝑡)(1 − 𝑇)         𝑖𝑓 𝑉𝑡 < 𝑉𝐺
} , 𝑂𝑉 =  ∑ 𝑂𝑉𝑡
𝑂𝑃
𝑡=1                          (4) 
The guarantee provided by the government is one of the three types of discrete-exercise 
options, i.e. European, American or Australian, each having a different exercise option. 
Justification of Approach 
There are several option pricing models that provide numerical methods for the valuation of 
the option, such as Black–Scholes (B-S) model, Lattice models (binomial options pricing model 
(binary tree); trinomial tree), Monte Carlo path-dependent simulation methods, Finite difference 
methods, Heston model, Heath–Jarrow–Morton framework, and Variance reduction gamma 
Payoff
GMTV
Traffic
Payoff Payoff
 
Option nCombinatio OptionNo
TrafficTrafficGMTV GMTV
Page | 15 
 
model (Mun, 2002; Damodaran, 2012; Hull, 2012). Almost all option pricing models are based 
on the stochastic differential equation. The B-S model and the binomial lattice model are the 
most common classic methods for pricing options (Black and Scholes, 1973; Cox et al., 1979).  
Real options gained popularity through the work of Black and Scholes on European style 
option valuation based on partial differential equations (1973). It is this standard model that this 
study has selected. Although B-S option pricing model has been developed for financial options 
and therefore has several limitations in assessing real options, it is essential to state the related 
assumptions when adapted to price real options. Readers refer to Black and Scholes (1973) for 
the B-S pricing formulas for call and put options. More details on standard B-S model’s 
assumptions are given by Kodukula and Papudesu (2006), Martins et al. (2014) and Jeong et al. 
(2015). 
Early Fund Generation Option 
The design of concession period for PPP-BOT projects is important for revenue risk 
management and financial viability analysis. The concession period may have a single-period 
structure or a two-period structure, its length may be fixed or variable, and it may be combined 
with incentive schemes. Different designs reflect different revenue risk management strategies. 
The single-period concession structure is for a fixed period of time, independent of whether this 
time is used for construction or operation. Reducing the construction period automatically allows 
the concessionaire to earn additional and earlier revenue streams, and is in the best interest of the 
concessionaire independent of any government incentives. Thus, the project company assumes 
revenue and completion risk and the EFG option is unnecessary. While the two-period 
concession structure could, to some extent, reduce the revenue and completion risk exposure to 
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the project company, depending on the incentive schemes (Ye and Tiong, 2003; Ng et al., 2007). 
Here, the authors consider the later alternative. 
The value of completing a PPP-BOT project early is a challenging issue, especially for the 
concessionaire. This may lead to an increase in cost but it brings the revenue stream on earlier, 
which enhances the profitability of the project. It is necessary to evaluate benefits and disbenefits 
of early completion of the project. This paper assumes that early completion of the project will 
result in earlier revenue stream and it is possible to compress project construction time which 
may result in an increase in overall project cost, although good project management and 
innovative construction methods can reduce construction time and not increase costs. It is also 
assumed that the government compensate the concessionaire with additional operating period 
equivalent to EFG period. An example of this is BOT power plant project which is completed 
earlier than scheduled commercial operation date (COD). This enabled the industries in the host 
country and region to produce goods and services earlier than originally planned. Early project 
completion is a win-win option for all parties involved as each benefits from the early use of the 
facility.  
The EFG is a put option written to the sponsor of the project by the government, the project 
construction cost or savings, or revenue stream generated earlier (the underlying cash flow) is 
considered as the underlying asset, the current price is expected construction cost or revenue 
stream, and the exercise price is project construction cost or revenue stream based on the 
contract. If the actual construction duration (𝐶𝐷) is shorter than the contracted construction 
duration (𝑡𝑐), the government would have to grant the concessionaire with additional operating 
period equivalent to EFG period. Otherwise, the government would not have to compensate the 
concessionaire. 
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The EFG option needs to be evaluated by both government and concessionaire. Figure 3 
represents the typical cumulative cash flow of PPP-BOT project including the EFG option. 
Figure 4 illustrates the typical components in the life-cycle of a PPP-BOT project including the 
EFG option. The concession period in two cases of without and with EFG option are calculated 
by equations 5 and 6 respectively: 
𝐶𝑃 = 𝐶𝐷 + 𝑂𝑃                                                                                       (5) 
𝐶𝑃′ = 𝐶𝐷′ + 𝐷𝐸𝐺 + 𝑂𝑃′                                                                        (6) 
where 𝐶𝐷/𝐶𝐷′ is the construction duration, 𝑂𝑃/𝑂𝑃′ is the operation period, and 𝐶𝑃/𝐶𝑃′ is the 
concession period in two cases of without and with EFG option respectively. 𝐷𝐸𝐺  is the duration 
of EFG. 
 
Figure 3 Cumulative cash flow of PPP-BOT project including the EFG 
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The present value, PV, of a discrete uniform series of the net benefits value from project 
operation, 𝑅, at the discount rate 𝑟, starting at time 𝑎 and continuing through time 𝑏, is estimated 
by equation 7: (Reinschmidt and Trejo, 2006) 
𝑃𝑉 =
𝑅
𝑟
[
1
(1+𝑟)𝑎
−
1
(1+𝑟)𝑏
]                                                                                  (7) 
Under the simplifying assumption that the benefits, 𝑅, are constant in time over the operation 
period of BOT-PPP project, PV at time zero (0) (start of construction) is estimated by equation 8: 
𝑃𝑉𝑏(𝑟, 𝐶𝐷) =
𝑅0[1−(1+𝑟)
−𝐶𝑃]
𝑟(1+𝑟)𝐶𝐷
                                                                    (8) 
The PV of a uniform series of costs over the construction period from time 𝑎 to time 𝑏 is: 
PVc =
𝐶
𝑟
[
1
(1+𝑟)𝑎
−
1
(1+𝑟)𝑏
]                                                           (9) 
With a = 0 and  b = CD then: 
 PVc(r, CD ) =
C0
r
[1 − (1 + r)−CD]                                               (10) 
The total NPV of the project, difference of present value of the benefits and present value of the 
costs, is estimated as following: 
𝑃𝑉(𝑟, 𝐶𝐷) = 𝑃𝑉𝑏(𝑟, 𝐶𝐷) − 𝑃𝑉𝑐(𝑟, 𝐶𝐷)                                               (11) 
The IRR, 𝑟0, is calculated by setting the total net PV to zero, and solving for 𝑟. The IRR is then 
compared with the hurdle rate to determine whether the project construction acceleration is 
economically desirable and justifiable. 
The PV of the benefit stream discounted at 𝑟0 for the project at shorter construction 
duration,𝐶𝐷′ < 𝐶𝐷, is estimated as follows. 
 𝑃𝑉𝑏(𝑟0, 𝐶𝐷
′) =
𝑅0[1−(1+𝑟0)
−𝐶𝑃′]
𝑟0(1+𝑟0)𝐶𝐷
′                                              (12) 
The ratio of the discounted present value of the net benefits for the accelerated project, 
𝑃𝑉𝑏(𝑟0, 𝐶𝐷
′), to the discounted present value of the net benefits for the original project, 
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𝑃𝑉𝑏(𝑟0, 𝐶𝐷). The percentage increase in present value of the project benefits due to shortening 
the construction duration from 𝐶𝐷 to 𝐶𝐷′is: 
∇= 100 [
𝑃𝑉𝑏(𝑟0,𝐶𝐷
′)
𝑃𝑉𝑏(𝑟0,𝐶𝐷)
− 1] = 100 {[(1 + 𝑟0)
𝐶𝐷−𝐶𝐷′] [
1−(1+𝑟0)
−𝐶𝑃′
1−(1+𝑟0)
−𝐶𝑃 ] − 1}                                       (13) 
In order to be financially feasible, the maximum acceptable percentage increase in discounted 
cost to complete project earlier is the percentage increase in discounted benefits gained from 
earlier completion. So, at the discounted rate 𝑟0, Equation 13 is also the maximum percentage 
increase in the present value of the project costs. In the case 𝐶𝑃 = 𝐶𝑃′ then the percentage 
increase in present value of the project benefits due to shortening the construction duration from 
𝐶𝐷 to 𝐶𝐷′ is: 
∇𝐶𝑃=𝐶𝑃′= 100{[(1 + 𝑟0)
𝐶𝐷−𝐶𝐷′] − 1}                                                                          (14) 
The EFG option value is formulated as follows: 
𝑂𝑉𝐸𝐹𝐺 = {
 ∇ × 𝑃𝑉𝑏(𝑟, 𝐶𝐷)           𝑖𝑓 𝐶𝐷 < 𝑡𝑐
 0                                    𝑖𝑓 𝐶𝐷 ≥ 𝑡𝑐
}                                                                 (15) 
The concessionaire (as owner of the option) will exercise the option only after learning that the 
current price (underlying cash flow at CD) is less than the exercise price (underlying cash flow at 
𝑡𝑐), i.e. CD is less than 𝑡𝑐. The payoff of EFG option as a put option and also the payoffs of two 
cases, with and without this option, are shown in Figure 5. 
 
 
Figure 5 Payoffs of Early Fund Generation (EFG) Option 
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Guaranteed Upper and Lower Bound of Revenue Option 
Achieving an appropriate investment return over the concession period is a very important aspect 
that influences success of the PPP project. This fact has pushed many governments involved in 
concession programmes in the past decade to include revenue risk mitigation mechanisms to 
encourage private participation. Currently, the government usually grants the concessionaire a 
minimum revenue guarantee (MRG). This is a right to build and operate the project in which the 
government compensates for any revenue shortfall in the life-cycle cash flow. The revenue 
guarantee put option contributes to estimate minimum return for concessionaire, which is called 
guaranteed minimum rate of return on equity (Min-GEROR), 𝑟𝑓, and measured by free cash flow 
to equity (FCFE) ( see equation 16). 
𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑒 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤 𝑡𝑜 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 (𝐹𝐶𝐹𝐸)  =  𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒 –  𝑂&𝑀 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠 –  𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒 –  𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑡𝑎𝑥                        (16) 
Despite the important advantages of this mechanism, it still has some drawbacks as it requires an 
upfront premium payment. Guaranteed Upper and Lower Bound of Revenue (MinMax-GR) 
overcomes this barrier by answering the question on how to determine an equitable cap of 
revenue to defray the cost of the floor under the uncertainty. The revenue call option (Max-GR) 
contributes to estimate equitable maximum return for concessionaire, which is called guaranteed 
maximum rate of return on equity (Max-GEROR), 𝑟𝑐, in order to limit the concessionaire’s 
profit to an acceptable/reasonable level. By this arrangement the government captures a portion 
of the income when the concessionaire’s revenue exceeds certain levels. The focus of this section 
is determining equitable guaranteed upper and lower bound for revenue and the corresponding 
guaranteed rate of return for project sponsors. 
Under MRG the government subsidizes the shortfall in revenue. It is a put option written to 
the sponsor of the project by the government. If the actual revenue in year t (𝑅𝑡
𝑎) does not reach 
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the level that has been guaranteed (𝑅𝑡
𝑔𝑚𝑖𝑛), as revenue floor for project sponsor, the government 
would have to make up any shortfall in revenue. Otherwise, the government would not have to 
pay any subsidy. The option value is formulated as follows: 
𝑅𝑡
𝑆𝐹 = {
(𝑅𝑡
𝑔𝑚𝑖𝑛 − 𝑅𝑡
𝑎
)                 𝑖𝑓 𝑅𝑡
𝑎 < 𝑅𝑡
𝑔𝑚𝑖𝑛
             0                             𝑖𝑓 𝑅𝑡
𝑎 ≥ 𝑅𝑡
𝑔𝑚𝑖𝑛
}                                         (17) 
𝑅𝑆𝐹 = ∑ 𝑅𝑡
𝑆𝐹𝑂𝑃
𝑡=𝐶𝐷+1             
𝑅𝑡
𝑆𝐹
, shortfall in revenue in year t, is the value of the option in year t and 𝑅𝑆𝐹 is the total value 
of the option over the operation period. 
Conversely, under revenue call option, if the actual revenue in year t (𝑅𝑡
𝑎) surpasses the pre-
specified maximum level that has been guaranteed 𝑅𝑡
𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥  (as revenue cap for project sponsor); 
the government would then have the right to call for excess cash flow. The government could 
equitably demand a cut in tariff rates to benefit the end users, boost taxes, or even directly 
participate in the upside of the project as repayment. The option value is formulated as follows: 
𝑅𝑡
𝑟 = {
(𝑅𝑡
𝑎 − 𝑅𝑡
𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥)                 𝑖𝑓 𝑅𝑡
𝑎 ≥ 𝑅𝑡
𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥
              0                            𝑖𝑓 𝑅𝑡
𝑎 < 𝑅𝑡
𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥
}                                              (18) 
𝑅𝑟 = ∑ 𝑅𝑡
𝑟𝑂𝑃
𝑡=𝐶𝐷+1     
𝑅𝑡
𝑟
, excess cash flow as repayment in year t, is the value of the option in year t and 𝑅𝑟  is the 
total value of the option over the operation period. 
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Figure 6 Minimum and maximum revenue guarantee, shortfall and excess revenue 
Figure 6 graphically illustrates the aforementioned discussion, including Min and Max 
revenue guarantee and the actual revenue equations. In this case, the government has to pay to 
the concessionaire the shortfall revenue in the period between A and B. Moreover, the 
government will call for excess revenue in the period between C and D. 
Fuzzy set theory: dealing with uncertainty and risk 
 
The determination of cash flow components as per the financial model is subject to 
uncertainty and risk, hence, Fuzzy technique was employed to address the uncertainties involved 
in cash flow estimation. Zadeh (1965, 1975) introduced the concept of Fuzzy set theory. Based 
on the extension principle, the arithmetic of fuzzy numbers can be derived. Generally, a fuzzy 
interval is represented by two Fuzzy numbers and a membership function, usually either a 
triangular or a trapezoidal one (TFN or TpFN) is used for uncertainty modelling, i.e. a process to 
represent subjective estimation of cash flow under uncertainties and risks and model uncertain 
variables as fuzzy numbers. 
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For the purpose of evaluating these two forms of guarantee and determine an equitable cap of 
guaranteed revenue, B-S model (Black and Scholes, 1973) is applied. To achieve this aim, the 
following steps are proposed. MRG and the linked cash flow is determined (put option-floor) 
based on the developed financial model for Min-GEROR,𝑟𝑓. Fuzzy set theory is applied for 
representing the subjective judgements of the decision maker, i.e. uncertainty modelling. The 
value of the MRG under assumed scenarios for uncertain variables is determined by using 
Equation 17 and representing the uncertain parameters corresponding to different scenarios as 
Fuzzy numbers. Then by assuming the same value of put option for call option, and using 
Equation 18, the cap of guaranteed revenue and linked cash flow for assumed scenarios are 
calculated (call option-cap). Subsequently yearly revenue-cap (YR-cap) and equity internal rate 
of return (EIRR) linked to the assumed scenarios (Max-GEROR,𝑟𝑐) are calculated based on the 
developed financial model and represented as Fuzzy numbers. Finally, by utilizing the Level 
Rank Method of defuzzification (Moller and Beer, 2004), the YR-cap and EIRR (call option-cap, 
defuzzified) at specific µ-cut/α-confidence level is determined as a crisp value. The concept of 
the Level Rank Method is based on the α-discretization. The membership scale of the fuzzy 
variable is discretized with the aid of chosen α-levels, and then the arithmetic mean of the 
interval centres of the α-level sets is computed as defuzzification result. 
The following illustrative example is used to show the concept and the applicability of the 
proposed option model, calculation methodology and its analysis. In the Iranian statute, “law on 
construction and development of roads and transportation infrastructures projects”, the 
government is permitted to subsidize projects, as cash subsidy, up to 50% of project investment. 
The government is also permitted to provide equity up to the maximum 10% of project 
investment. If the ratio of the actual annual income over expected annual income is less than 
Page | 24 
 
0.85, the government will make up the shortfall up to the maximum of 25% of the project’s 
expected revenue. This is classified as MRG as a mechanism that aims for risk allocation. The 
Saveh-Salafchegan freeway was constructed under this law with government involvement at 
60% and private sector involvement at 40% of the project investment. This project now in 
operation (Iranian statute, 1987; Attarzadeh, 2007). The structure of this kind of governmental 
support is shown in Figure 7 and Figure 8. 𝐸𝑣 is expected traffic volume. 
The proposed method in this section is applied to find the equitable guaranteed bound of 
revenue (cap) under the uncertainty of traffic volume for the case study, Saveh-Salafchegan 
freeway project. Fuzzy set theory is applied for modelling of the uncertainty in the decision 
making process, i.e. to model uncertain variables as fuzzy numbers. The traffic volume as 
uncertain variable is represented by triangular fuzzy number “T.F.N” Ẽ𝑣 𝑇𝑟𝑖: 〈4.38,7.3,10.293〉 
million vehicles/year. Figure 9 demonstrates equitable guaranteed bound of cash flow resulted 
from call and put options. 
 
Figure 7 Bundle of options of minimum traffic/revenue guarantee based on the Iranian statute for Iranian toll 
road/highway projects 
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Figure 8 Estimated revenue and minimum and maximum guaranteed revenue based on the Iranian statute for 
Iranian toll road/highway projects 
 
Figure 9 Equitable guaranteed bound of revenue resulted from call and put options for Saveh-Salafchegan 
freeway project 
Based on the real options analysis, the fair bound cap is determined as (1.25𝐸𝑣, 1.41𝐸𝑣). The 
result shows if the ratio of the actual annual revenue over expected annual revenue is more than 
1.25 (i.e. Actual traffic volume exceeds the expected traffic volume), the government will share 
the revenue in excess of 1.25 of the expected annual revenue with concessionaire up to the 
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maximum of 16%. If the ratio of actual annual revenue over expected annual revenue is more 
than 1.41, the government will take the revenue in excess of 1.41 of the expected annual revenue. 
The illustrative case of Iranian toll road/highway projects shows that there are three sets of 
incentive mechanism in PPP-BOT scheme which can be applied as options to manage traffic 
volume uncertainty and vulnerability. First, extending or reducing the concession period based 
on the evolution of traffic. Second, renegotiate the economic terms of the contract when there is 
a substantial variation in the traffic volume from the original contract (e.g.: through MRG). 
Third, if the traffic volume is outside the agreed minimum and maximum bound a sharing 
mechanism is triggered (Attarzadeh, 2007; Vassallo and Gallego, 2005). 
Case Study 
A detailed case study is considered in this section to illustrate the application of the real option 
models that were developed in the previous sections. ROV is applied to examine two 
governmental supports and incentives for a BOT project. Information on this case was gathered 
from project stakeholders such as government agency, Project Company and financial institution.  
 The South Isfahan Power Plant (SIPP) project was constructed as Iran’s first private power 
plant. The Energy Conversion Agreement (ECA) contract was signed in middle of 2002 and the 
project is now in the operational stage. The first unit of this power plant was synchronized in 
middle of 2005. The whole project was operational by mid-2006. Before this project was 
launched, the government controlled all the power plants in the country. An Iranian-German 
consortium implemented the project under a BOT scheme. The power plant is located 60 
kilometers from the historical city of Isfahan in central Iran. The nominal capacity of the plant at 
ISO and design condition is estimated at 954 and 734 megawatts respectively. The project was 
implemented at a base cost of M€320. 
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The SIPP comprises six 159-megawatt power generation units which were brought on stream 
as each unit was completed. The public and private sectors benefit from the EFG option by faster 
construction and earlier operation of the project. The EFG option was design as an incentive to 
the concessionaire. It was agreed that the government compensate the concessionaire EFG period 
which is the period of saved time in construction phase. 
 The original construction period was 4 years and the earlier completion period was 1 year. 
The concessionaire operates the project for a period of 21 years. Only the first year includes 
EFG. (𝑟0 = 0.16, 𝐶𝑃 = 24 , 𝐶𝑃
′ = 25, 𝐶𝐷 = 4, 𝐶𝐷′ = 3, 𝐷𝐸𝐺 = 1, 𝑂𝑃 = 20, 𝑂𝑃
′ = 21). 
The percentage increase in discounted benefits gained from earlier completion was 16% 
(Equation 14). The percentage increase in discounted cost to complete project earlier was 8%. So 
the net benefit was 7% of the PW of the yearly net benefit which is equal to M€2.23. EFG option 
contributes to secure the return for concessionaire at minimum acceptable rate based on free cash 
flow to equity (rate of return on equity). 
The overall contractual package also included granted guaranteed minimum revenue which 
contributes to secure the minimum return on equity (Min-GEROR), 𝑟𝑓 = 15%. Now the 
question is that what would be a fair guaranteed maximum revenue and estimated corresponding 
maximum return (Max-GEROR), 𝑟𝑐, under the uncertainty of quantity of production (yearly 
generated energy). Through Max-GR the government captures a portion of the income when the 
concessionaire’s revenue exceeds certain levels. 
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Figure 10 Membership function of quantity of production (yearly generated energy (GWH))-uncertain 
random variable 
Since the input parameters include uncertain random variables, the actual revenue and 
corresponding cash flow is also treated as uncertain random variable. Fuzzy set is utilized to 
model this uncertainty. The membership function of an uncertain random variable, quantity of 
production (yearly generated energy (GWH)), is represented in Figure 10. The quantity of 
production as Fuzzy variable (GWH) is: Tr.F.N, 〈6044.2, 6430, 6430, 6622.9 〉. A total of three 
different scenarios (optimistic, most likely and pessimistic scenarios) have been constructed in 
order to capture this uncertainty in a fuller picture. The option value of Min-GR and Max-GR are 
estimated by equations 17 and 18 respectively. B-S model is utilized to determine a fair cap of 
revenue and estimate equitable rate of return, 𝑟𝑐. The risk-free interest rate and standard 
deviation are assumed 5% and 25% respectively. By using the Excel solver the cash flow linked 
to Min-GR which secures the Min-GEROR, 𝑟𝑓 = 15%, under three assumed scenarios is 
determined. Then again by using the Excel solver and assuming the same value of put option for 
call option, Max-GR and the linked cash flow for three assumptions are calculated and 
corresponding Max-GEROR is estimated. 
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Figure 11 Fuzzy representation of cap-EIRR resulted from three scenarios cash flows linked to Max-GR 
 
Figure 12 Fuzzy representation of guaranteed EIRR (bound within floor and cap) 
 
 
Figure 13 the guaranteed bound of revenue (M€) resulted from call and put options during the operation 
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Consequently yearly revenue-cap (YR-cap) and equity internal rate of return (EIRR) linked to 
three scenarios are calculated and represented as Fuzzy numbers (See Figure 11). Finally, by 
utilizing the Level Rank Method of defuzzification, the YR-cap and EIRR (call option-cap, 
defuuzified) at specific µ-cut/α-confidence level is determined as a crisp value. The fair cap of 
EIRR is determined: 𝑟𝑐 = 19.5%. The guaranteed EIRR (bound within floor and cap) is 
represented as Fuzzy number (See Figure 12). The guaranteed bound of revenue resulted from 
call and put options during the operation period as final result is shown in Figure 13. The 
guaranteed bound of revenue has been established for SIPP project based on the described 
procedure and computation method. Setting a higher floor threshold secures not only timely debt 
repayment but also an acceptable rate of return on equity. Conversely setting a lower floor 
threshold may lead to weaken timely debt service and realize a partial debt guarantee. To make 
the case study more concrete, however, the key parameters will be altered in the subsequent 
sensitivity analyses to examine their impact on the value of the options. Therefore financial 
models for different scenarios are constructed in a spreadsheet environment. 
Sensitivity Analysis of Option Values 
In practice, it is always sensible to study how sensitive the estimated option values are to the key 
input parameters such as supply, demand and tariff distributions. By varying the factors of 
uncertainty, the sensitivity analysis of guarantee value provides better insights and leads to a 
more consistent view of the appropriate level of guarantee. This is particularly significant in a 
PPP negotiation context. Figures 14 and 15 show the results of the sensitivity analyses of put and 
call option values, subject to changes in the quantity of yearly production and tariff. It should be 
emphasized that the range of values shown here is sufficient to support the arguments presented 
below. It is not difficult to re-run the analysis and adjust the range of values for sensitivity 
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analysis. As can be seen, the value of put option is almost equally sensitive to the quantity of 
yearly production and tariff. On the other hand, the value of call option seems to be more 
sensitive to only the quantity of yearly production, although changes in either will significantly 
affect project NPV. It should be noted that the standard deviations of these two variables 
determine the volatility of the project cash flow, which is a key determinant of the value of the 
two options evaluated. The findings essentially underline the differences in risks that the 
government and the project sponsor are encountered. 
 
Figure 14 Sensitivity Analysis of Put Option Value over the Whole Operation Period 
 
 
Figure 15 Sensitivity Analysis of Call Option Value over the Whole Operation Period 
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Implications and Limitations of the Case Study and Current Research 
The above case study of a power plant project effectively illustrates how EFG and MinMax-
GR options can be considered and evaluated as a put/call option by real option valuation. The 
results show the significance of the valuation of these options to both host government and 
investors, and provide them with a clear reference when negotiating on the level of government 
support. It is interesting to note that with the increasing of tariff, the value of put option increases 
while the value of call option decreases. Another important point to note is that the valuation 
methodology proposed and demonstrated in this paper can be easily integrated into the classical 
discounted cash flow setting that is conveniently implemented in spreadsheets. Consequently, the 
information embedded in such models is very transparent and facilitates a better and fairer 
negotiation between the two parties. 
PPP projects are so complicated, while on the other hand, real option models have to 
minimise the real conditions, require a high level of knowledge from staff, but produce little 
practical recommendations to the practice. Although, this study confirms that ROV is stronger 
evaluation approach than simple NPV, the case study demonstrates that it suffers from a few 
realistic limitations. First, RO models are technically more demanding. Second, RO models are 
mathematically more complex. Third, RO models suffer from the fact that estimation of 
assumptions/input parameters, such as volatility, is problematic. All these add to the complexity 
of RO models. Intelligibly, practitioner would prefer a model that is more intuitive to facilitate 
decision making. Finally, the case study presented in this paper only illustrates a few factors of 
uncertainty, which are the quantity of production and tariff. 
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Conclusion and Recommendations 
PPP-BOT projects’ commissioning has not been without trouble due to multiple uncertainties 
embedded in these projects. Consequently, private investors require some options for mitigation 
of these risks and setting the revenue through government support. Host governments often 
provide subsidies, guarantees or alternative forms of support as incentives specially designed to 
alleviate the concern of revenue risk and to attract private sector participation. The project would 
have faced cancellation simply due to a negotiation breakdown when individual parties focus 
solely on risks and not properly factoring the value of the support package into their 
considerations. Thus project stakeholders should take a holistic view of risk and value in the 
negotiation process. Mechanisms for sharing the risk between the public and private sectors as a 
way to overcome the revenue risks are necessary. Value can be created by incorporating 
flexibility in different stages of a project life cycle.  
This study indicated that government support, which can be interpreted as a form of call/put 
option, plays important roles in PPP-BOT project success and should be carefully designed and 
formulated. The aim of this research was to conduct an investigation into how real option 
analysis can be applied in modelling the contractual/ managerial flexibilities to mitigate and 
manage the revenue risk in PPP projects. The model developed in this paper adds to the literature 
by proposing a valuation method for EFG option. Furthermore, it contributes in the calculation of 
feasible and equitable bound for a guaranteed revenue which is in interest of both parties. With 
real option theory, a methodology is presented to grant a MRG in exchange for sharing upside 
revenue under supply/demand uncertainty. The approach presented in this paper makes use of 
fuzzy set theory to address uncertainties in simulation of a cash flow model. EFG and MinMax-
GR supports are modelled as real options. The proposed methodology is then applied to the cases 
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of the freeway and power plant projects in Iran (illustrative example and case study) to show its 
applicability and illustrate how to evaluate the EFG option. It also shows how a negotiation band 
for a guaranteed revenue can be constructed, which would enlarge the feasible bargaining range 
for both parties. These features are evaluated using a combination of real option and spreadsheet-
based financial models. The risk implications found in the case has also been discussed. 
Effectively there are some advantages associated with these options and their value can 
indeed be significant relative to the basic net present value of no-option scenario and properly 
applicable in PPP projects. By incorporating these option values, many of the risk factors that 
affect the project’s revenue can be mitigated. It provides useful interpretations of the meaning 
and importance of government guarantees and also highlights other aspects of flexibility in the 
design and execution of a project. The proposed model in the context of infrastructure 
investments is simply meant for decision making. The result of this method is intuitive and much 
preferred by practitioners.  
The presented equations for valuation model of EFG option provide a quick estimate of the 
trade-off between project time and costs, to estimate the maximum percentage by which one 
could increase costs in order to shorten the delivery time. The results also showed that through 
MinMax-GR option the government guaranteed the minimum revenue for the concessionaire 
which led to reducing the financial costs of the project, mitigating financial fluctuations, 
facilitating concession financing, and increasing the bidder’s competitiveness in the tender 
process. In return the concessionaire had to share extra revenues with the government if the 
collected revenues surpassed the threshold established in the bidding terms. It made the revenue 
risk distribution fairer and lenders felt more comfortable in lending to project (higher 
bankability). It was also effective in reducing renegotiation pressures by the concessionaire. 
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Despite the important advantages of this mechanism, it may cause negative implications for the 
public budget in the case of an economic recession. Furthermore, in the case that the total 
collected revenue throughout the project’s life cycle will not be sufficient to recoup the 
concessionaire’s investment, a direct government subsidy is necessary to make the project 
financially viable. So, a guaranteed bound of revenue option has limited applicability in such 
cases. 
In spite of these findings, there remain some limitations to this study and the following areas 
are recommended for further research: Firstly, the project value based on real option analysis 
approach will be inadequate if the future cash flow, such as revenue and operating costs, is 
inappropriately projected. Moreover, it is still not easy to properly estimate project cash flow 
volatility in infrastructure investment since obtaining proper data about infrastructure investment 
is no mean task. For further studies, these limitations and possible solutions could be 
investigated. Secondly, the scope of this paper has been limited to the evaluation of the EFG and 
MinMax-GR options. It is desirable to consider other types of government support which could 
be offered to concessionaire as options. Future work could focus on the evaluation of these 
options by real options valuation. The cost of the guarantees to the government must be 
estimated and compared with the equivalent subsidies in order to ascertain which approach is 
more effective in reducing the project risk and uncertainty. This issue still remains to be 
addressed in future work. 
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